Climate Negotiations Six Months After Copenhagen

Is now six months on from the meeting which took place in December 2009 in Copenhagen which was to conclude global arrangements for a worldwide policy regime towards climate change to come into operation in 2012 and follow on from the arrangements agreed in 1997 under the Kyoto Protocol.

Expectations had been raised for the outcome of the Copenhagen meeting which was to conclude negotiations organised globally under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which had been initiated in Bali two years earlier in late 2007. At Bali it was agreed that negotiations would focus on emissions mitigation, adaptation responses to climate change, innovation and technology, and finally on finance and trade. Negotiating progress at the Copenhagen meeting produced the Copenhagen Accord, but this was limited in scope and only seemingly a small step towards agreement on a post-Kyoto regime.

In essence major differences in approach between key countries, and especially between the group of large population, low wage developing countries labelled as the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, China, India, and ASEAN) and the large OECD players in the form of the US and the EU were put on hold pending further negotiation. The Copenhagen Accord contains three central elements in the form of a listing of prior unilateral commitments to emissions reductions by key countries, a process of mutual verification of these commitments, and a commitment by developed countries to 'work towards' establishing a climate fund to the tune of $100 billion/year by 2020 to assist developing countries cope with climate change.

The Accord makes no joint commitments to fresh post-Kyoto commitments, makes no reference for a process of enforcement, nor makes no reference as to how a new regime dovetails with the prior Kyoto regime. The agreement in Copenhagen was to meet one year later in Mexico for further negotiations, and after that meet again in Johannesburg in 2012.

The reality seems to have been both that the differences between the key players were so deep in Copenhagen and that these had not been centrally dealt with, or even really acknowledged by all parties, that agreement of such far-reaching significance for global economic performance was impossible. In hindsight, Copenhagen would probably never have been much more than a prelude to the substantive negotiation that seemingly must almost inevitably occur in the next few years.

Despite press coverage at the time of Copenhagen over the scientific process in the earth sciences as reflected in the reports of the International Panel on Climate Change, most earth scientists keep to a position that the potential long-run catastrophic consequences of climate change must eventually force a global policy response. Latest calculations from earth scientists suggest that to maintain temperature change globally to less than 2°C by 2050 may require reductions on emissions relative to trend growth of around 80 per cent (and some even suggest 90 per cent). Such calculations have high variance since economic growth rates are highly uncertain, as are likely improvements in energy conversion efficiencies (and resulting emissions). But add to this the risks beyond 2050 of major regime change such as a rapid melt of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and seemingly policy response must follow.

China, for instance, at a growth rate of 7.5 per cent between 2000 and 2050 increases by a factor of 30 in GDP size. And China already is close to being the largest country carbon emitter already. But in Copenhagen the developed countries who had concluded the Kyoto Protocol did not engage in any serious way the developing countries (and specifically China) until very late in the process.

China, India, and others made compelling arguments about the terms for their involvement in the post-Kyoto regime. Cuts they argued should be based on cumulative emissions over decades, not the annual flow today. The majority of emissions in the upper atmosphere reflect OECD industrialization over many decades, while developing countries are only new emitters.

Moreover, in 1994 the UNFCCC framework clearly set out a principle referred to as 'common but differentiated responsibilities' under which developing countries would have special treatment reflecting their development aspirations. Add to this a whole range of secondary (but still important) issues such as whether cuts should be based on production or consumption of emissions embodied in goods and services, the treatment of Kyoto noncompliance, enforcement mechanisms, choice of base date for commitments, whether commitments are made into level or intensity form and a negotiation of such complexity beckoned that realistically the only feasible Copenhagen outcome was to put substantive negotiation on hold.

Unfortunately what has transpired since Copenhagen is seemingly no progress or even serious discussion of these key issues. Meanwhile, frustrations build in the developing world, including over action on the initial pledges to show progress towards the Copenhagen promised climate fund. Some of the developing country negotiators have already seemingly written off the Mexico meeting as unlikely to yield significant progress and are focused instead on Johannesburg meeting to follow.

Efforts were made by some countries to make climate into a lead G20 issue for the recent Toronto Summit but these were resisted by others. Perhaps in Korea in November climate can be a lead issue at the next G20 meeting, but as of now prospects for significant or major global progress seems stymied.

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